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Independent foreign policy of the new Russia has seen the light of day in 
the 1990s, and was represented, as is widely known, by the first President 
of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin. It is just as well known that Yeltsin 
could not be more different than the last President of the defunct Soviet 
Union, Michael Gorbachev. It is a paradox, however, that the difference 
was not evident in foreign policy. On the international scene B. Yeltsin and 
his Foreign Minister Andrei Kozirev carried on from where M. Gorbachev 
and Eduard Shevardnadze left off. The two teams even competed in a way: 
which of the leaders would secure greater support from the West.
Initially, it seemed that Yeltsin was the one who won. Pragmatic 
Western leaders, adoring and bowing down to “Gorbie” a minute before, 
quickly changed sides and went for his main opponent. The general pub-
lic in the West, however, responded somewhat differently, remaining cau-
tious towards Yeltsin. Gorbachev was perceived as a civilized and intelligent 
politician, whereas Yeltsin was seen as a true embodiment of the “enigmatic 
Russian soul”. He appeared as a genuine “Russian bear”, unpredictable, im-
pulsive, at times even aggressive; especially later, when he, unlike ever-con-
ciliatory Gorbachev, came to be very resolute, only to turn “diplomatic” all 
of a sudden again.
Other differences between the two leaders also became more obvious. 
Once in power, Yeltsin never saw foreign policy as a central political issue, 
while Gorbachev had always considered it as of being of special importance. 
And as things went from bad to worse for him at home, Gorbachev was 
becoming more eager to run abroad into the arms of Western politicians 
and the applauding Western public. Only later did a similar frame of mind 
become noticeable in Yeltsin as well, but not as prominently.
Another important detail: at the time of Gorbachev and his per-
estroika, attempts were made to develop a philosophical framework for the 
changing world and the role of the USSR in it. The Secretary General of 
the USSR Communist Party wrote a widely-known book, Perestroika: New 
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Thinking for Our Country and the World. Nothing of the kind can be found 
in the books Yeltsin published at the beginning of his career or later on. The 
little that was written about foreign policy appears quite superficial, even 
rudimentary.
On the other hand, the Russian foreign policy of the period can-
not be described as ideology free. On the contrary: instead of no ideology 
in foreign policy, one ideology was simply replaced by another. Instead of 
communist ideology and aspirations for world leadership, foreign policy in-
creasingly reflected frustrations of a country which had thrown itself at the 
mercy of the Cold War winners, a country with no aspirations whatsoever. 
Initially, however, the Russian perception of the collapse of Communism 
was completely different. It was seen as a victory and a return to normal 
processes of development. If there was a defeat, then it was the peace that 
broke out in the aftermath of the Cold War that was lost rather than the 
war itself.
There is yet another point of interest. Not only that Kozirev in his 
capacity as Foreign Minister did not seek to cooperate with civil society and 
governmental structures in building a common foreign policy at national 
level, but he threw himself into the internal political battle raging in Russia 
at the time. It was he who coined the characteristic label “war party”, us-
ing it indiscriminately for all political opponents and rivals. This, of course, 
made any cooperation with the legislature, civil society structures and the 
expert community utterly impossible.
A case in point was Russia’s joining the anti-Serbian sanctions at 
the time of the Yugoslav crisis (1991–1995). The motives lying behind this 
step were largely ideological. Kozirev saw the Serbian leadership as mere 
“national-communists” and had no intention of being lenient with them. 
Complex geopolitical processes and Russian national interests were of little 
concern to him in this case.
Kozirev even allowed himself a mild criticism of the United States 
for their ostensibly belated recognition of the independence of the Yugoslav 
republics. “In the beginning,” he writes, “until the very break of the SFRY, 
the USA consistently ignored the demands of this very Bosnia and other 
federal republics for sovereignty, and advocated until the very last moment 
the preservation of the [Yugoslav] federal state regardless of its communist 
nature. Is this not the reason for the strong anti-Yugoslav charge in Wash-
ington, a feeling of original guilt?”1
In order that the position of the Russian Foreign Ministry at the time 
can be understood, the following episode may be a useful illustration. Asked 
by the former US President R. Nixon to give him an outline of the interests 
1 A. V. Kozirev, Преображение (Moscow 1995), 125.
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of the new Russia, Kozirev said: “…one of the problems with the USSR was 
that we paid too much attention to our national interests, so to speak. Even 
now we tend to pay more attention to universal human values. But, if you 
have some ideas, if you can help us and suggest how to define our national 
interests, I would be very grateful.”
Later on, Nixon commented on the Russian Foreign Minister’s reply: 
“When I was Vice-President and then President I wanted everybody to 
know what a Son-of-a-Bitch I am, and that I will fight for American inter-
ests with all my might. [Henry] Kissinger was one such S-o-B, so I could 
learn a few more things from him. And this man, now that Russia needs to 
be protected and strengthened after the collapse of the Soviet Union, wants 
to show everybody how nice and affable he is!”2
This failure to develop theoretical and conceptual approaches was 
increasingly noticeable as time went by. Lack of ability and of the wish 
to understand the real state of affairs led to a long-held naïve belief in the 
altruism of Western democracies, that the West would forego its own in-
terests and welcome Russia with open arms into the “family of progressive 
democracies” and share the burden of the transitional reforms in a brotherly 
way. When concessions were demanded of Russia, the demands were will-
ingly met. Russia even made unsolicited concessions. What was seen as 
paramount was to build up, at any price, relations with leading Western na-
tions, the USA above all. Russian diplomacy followed their lead, expecting 
that the compliance would earn a ticket to the “civilized world”.
The years 1991–1993 are believed to have been a period of “infatu-
ation” in Russian foreign policy, a honeymoon which lasted three “honey 
years”. What put an end to it in 1993 was the decision to expand NATO 
into Eastern Europe. It is this eastward expansion of NATO and the Yugo-
slav conflict that largely unravelled the strategic goals of the North-Atlantic 
Alliance.
The Yugoslav conflict marked the beginning of NATO engagements 
outside of its zone of responsibility; and not defensive, but offensive, using 
its full military arsenal. It became clear it was not only about spreading de-
mocracy and democratic values, human rights and the like.
After some initial reluctance, the USA declared itself the only winner 
of the Cold War and, consequently, entitled to “war trophies”: to expanding 
perceptibly its influence, even hegemony, in the modern-day world. This 
issue was addressed by President Vladimir Putin in his much debated Mu-
nich speech. The speech provoked a strong reaction. The public refusal of 
obedience caused a psychological shock: Russia turned out to be able to say 
“nyet”.
2 Y. M. Primakov, Годы в большой политике (Moscow 1999), 210–211  .
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It has also become obvious that many things are perceived in differ-
ent ways in Russia and in the West, the Yugoslav crisis for one. Many such 
examples can be found in a book of the Scottish analyst Sarah McArthur.3 
For instance, in Russia the World War Two pro-Nazi Independent State 
of Croatia is seen in a negative light, and the famous “Islamic Declaration” 
of the Bosnian Muslim community leader Alija Izetbegović is perceived as 
fundamentalist and as one of the main causes of the civil war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. In the West, while not justifying the horrible, large-scale anti-
Serb and anti-Jewish crimes of Croatian World War Two fascists, it still is 
believed, as Franjo Tudjman did, that the Independent State of Croatia was 
an expression of the will of its people to live independently. The views on the 
“Islamic Declaration” are even more drastically divergent: in the West, it is 
included in political science courses as an example of Islamic democracy. A 
list of similar misinterpretations could go on.
We are yet to learn to listen to each other and to respect each other’s 
opinion, hopefully based on reliable and verifiable facts. The so-called “New 
Europeans” might play a key role in this complex matter, for the Central and 
South-Eastern European mentality is much closer to the Eastern Euro-
pean mentality than the Western one is. Unfortunately, this process has not 
begun yet. Furthermore, some new members of NATO and the EU make 
such an intra-European dialogue even more difficult.
Be that as it may, without Russia it is not possible for NATO to solve 
a number of difficult problems, the Balkan issue included. Nor is it possible 
for Russia not to cooperate with NATO in the modern global world. Yet, 
rather than merely ceremonial, this should be a day-to-day working rela-
tionship. And most importantly, this relationship has to become an honest 
cooperation for both parties.
Let us go back to the 1990s. The weakening of Russia’s international 
position was inevitable following the collapse of the USSR, coupled with 
her transition-induced, mostly economic problems. The only question is 
how far this retreat had to go. Namely, not even the West formulated its 
goals at once. They in part depended on the position Russia would eventu-
ally take. Russia’s continuous concessions only whetted the appetite of the 
other side. Not that Russian opinion was ignored. Russia often simply had 
no opinion! Suffice it to say that the Russian Foreign Ministry, in spite of 
its many promises, had never come up with its own programme for solving 
the Yugoslav crisis.
By the mid-1990s Russian foreign-policy failures became more and 
more obvious. Consequently, the policy of the Foreign Ministry now had 
3 S. McArthur,  Когда к штыку приравняли перо. Деятельность СМИ по освещению 
боснийского кризиса 1992–1995 гг. (Moscow 2007).
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against it not only the Opposition but virtually the entire political elite and 
the expert community. The attitude crystallized that Russia had to have its 
own identity and place in world politics. Of course, this did not imply her 
getting into argument with the West over trifles, which would entail con-
frontation. But there was no need to be acquiescent, at times to the detri-
ment of Russian interests. 
On the other hand, the Foreign Ministry was not the only one to 
blame for the series of foreign-policy failures. The leadership of the country 
shared the blame inasmuch as it had created a system in which the Foreign 
Ministry was able to operate without any control and in a monopolistic po-
sition. It is probably this lack of a collegial mechanism in the process of de-
veloping and implementing policies that was the major flaw in the system. 
The old institutions, such as the International Department of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had been dis-
banded and no new ones were set up. It seemed that Yeltsin simply signed 
virtually everything that Kozirev put before him without reading the small 
print or bothering much with additional consultations.
To tell the truth, the Foreign Ministry, or any other similar depart-
ment, could not be expected to generate elaborate foreign policy concepts, 
and not even as a result of the ill will of its top ranks. There were objective 
limitations. Traditionally, the role of a diplomat is not to generate ideas but 
to implement them. In that respect diplomats resemble soldiers. They can 
only be more or less successful in following their instructions, depending on 
personal abilities. However, precisely that was lacking: strategic instructions 
from the top officials of the Russian Foreign Ministry.
Many astute observers noticed this strange phenomenon. During 
Yeltsin’s term of office attempts were made to set up a special mechanism 
for coordinating foreign-policy activities among different departments. The 
attempts failed for various reasons, but mostly because the leadership of the 
Foreign Ministry actively opposed the whole project. Kozirev managed to 
implement two presidential decrees confirming the coordinating role of the 
Foreign Ministry in foreign-policy issues. A third decree of similar nature 
was signed by Yeltsin’s next Foreign Minister, Y. Primakov. At the end of 
the day, the Russian Foreign Ministry was assigning tasks to itself, fulfilling 
them by itself, coordinating itself, and all this under its own control.
All these developments took place in the 1990s, a watershed period 
for Europe and the world at large. The old European security system cre-
ated in a bipolar world collapsed and a new one was formed in its place. The 
formation of this new system was significantly influenced by the Yugoslav 
crisis. Sadly, it took the Russian Foreign Ministry long to understand that.
In early 1996 Andrei Kozirev was eventually retired. It is indicative 
that Yeltsin blamed him for two things: for NATO’s rapid eastward expan-
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sion, and for a lack of political “precision”, particularly with regard to the 
former Yugoslavia. The Russian President’s diagnosis was accurate, but it 
came too late to change the course of some developments. In early 1996 Y. 
Primakov was appointed Foreign Minister. Primakov, an experienced ex-
pert, was not reluctant to speak of Russian national interests. Russia inten-
sified relations not only with the West, but with the East too. Her foreign 
policy began to be defined as multivectorial. A multipolar world also began 
to be mentioned. Yet, on the whole, Russian diplomacy failed to reverse the 
negative trends and to put herself on an equal footing with the West.
Therefore, two flaws in the Russian foreign policy of that period 
emerge most prominently: too much attention paid to a new ideology in-
stead of developing an ideology-free outlook, and a monopoly of the diplo-
matic department in the process of decision-making. 
*  *  *
Let us put across a few observations about the contemporary Balkans. We 
should try to understand what the Balkans is today and what happened 
there during the 1990s. And not just out of idle curiosity. One can speak 
about a Russian Balkan policy so long as there is a Balkans as a distinct 
region. That there still is such a region is open to doubt given that Eastern 
Europe as a distinct region disappeared with the collapse of Communism. 
To be more precise, what counts as Eastern Europe today amounts to Rus-
sia, Ukraine and Belarus. The rest of it broke again into Central and South-
Eastern Europe (i.e. the Balkans). Not to mention the former DDR, now 
integrated into Western Europe.
But even the Balkans is in the process of breaking into two parts. Slo-
venia, and Croatia, are somewhat ashamed of their Balkan roots and seek to 
position themselves as constituent elements of Central Europe. At the same 
time, in the West and the world at large, a new and not quite appropriate 
term, a mere result of the current political conjuncture, “the Western Bal-
kans”, has come into use to denote the post-Yugoslav states minus Slovenia 
plus Albania. 
In spite of everything, however, the Balkans seems to be a sustainable 
region. It has its distinctive history, geography, culture, mentality. The fact 
that most Balkan states were part of the “Eastern bloc” and are now join-
ing, or have already joined, the EU and NATO is not fundamental. Greece 
is a case in point. Regardless of her fifty years within NATO and the EU, 
Greece typologically remains a Balkan country, and there are no indications 
that other Balkan countries will fare differently in the foreseeable future.
What happened, then, in the Balkans during the 1990s? It seems 
that there were at least three separate processes. They affected one another, 
producing various complex combinations.
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One process was quite obvious: the Yugoslav crisis itself. The crisis 
was related to other significant events across Eastern Europe: the Perestroi-
ka and collapse of the USSR, and the so-called “velvet revolutions” in the 
Socialist countries of Eastern Europe in 1989, even though not all of them 
were so “velvety”. In Yugoslavia this process extended for a full decade, and 
was bloodiest. It resulted in the collapse of the multinational federation, a 
federation riddled with a host of serious internal problems. Moreover, the 
collapse came about without any agreement having been reached, which 
was one of the main causes of the war or, to be more precise, a series of wars 
spreading from the northwest to the southeast of the former Yugoslavia.
Another process unfolding in the Balkans was the internationaliza-
tion of the Balkan conflict, in other words the involvement of the “interna-
tional community” in the conflict. This involvement was responsible to an 
extent for the ten years of warfare: it precipitated recognition of new states, 
overtly sponsored some parties in the conflict at the expense of others, and 
so on. 
Speaking about peace in the aftermath of the Cold War, Russian phi-
losopher Alexander Zinoviev observed that “Communism was aimed at but 
Russia was hit”. By analogy, one might say that Western mediators aimed at 
Slobodan Milošević, but hit Serbia. This explains a lot.
The process of international involvement in the Yugoslav crises can 
be termed the process of NATOization of the Balkans, and seen as part of 
a broader process, that of NATO’s eastward expansion. In some cases this 
expansion was peaceful, with countries voluntarily joining the alliance, such 
as the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe; in others, such as Yugo-
slavia, there was a civil war. At any rate, the gap left by the disappearance of 
a bipolar world was being filled.
The process of NATO’s eastward expansion was closely connected 
with another and even broader trend: the setting up of a new, both Europe-
an and international, security model. This is precisely what sets the Yugoslav 
crisis apart from other recent interethnic conflicts in Europe, such as those 
in Northern Ireland or Cyprus. It was precisely at the time of the Yugoslav 
crisis that NATO began to assume a pivotal role in the building of a new 
European security system.
Yet another key element should be stressed: the Balkans has always 
been an object rather than a subject of international relations. The NA-
TOization of the Balkans only proves this observation. In light of Balkan 
history, this process is not an unusual one, as evidenced not only by cen-
turies-long Ottoman or Austro-Hungarian rule, but also by more recent 
decades in Balkan history. Processes in the Balkans have followed a pattern. 
Thus the 1940s were marked by fascization, followed by a period of about 
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half a century that could be termed Sovietization and, finally, the present 
– NATOization.
It may be of interest to point out that all three processes – fasciza-
tion, Sovietization and NATOization – met with strongest resistance in one 
and the same country, Yugoslavia, and mostly by its Serbian population. To 
explain this phenomenon of Serbian unwillingness to compromise would 
require a separate and sophisticated analysis. We shall only observe that the 
Serbs are a small nation with the mentality of a large one. This aspect of 
their self-perception provides a mine of possible explanations.
Only Greece has managed to an extent to escape the pattern of a 
Balkan country, but similar processes can be observed even there: the period 
of occupation during the Second World War – fascism; then seven years of 
the “black colonels” military dictatorship (1967–1974) which can be seen as 
its echo; an attempt at Sovietization during the civil war 1946–1949; and 
finally, the first Balkan state to join NATO as early as 1952.
We believe that the optimum solution for the Balkans would be 
to apply the old motto: “The Balkans to the Balkan peoples!” At present 
though, it seems utopian. 
Finally, one of the consequences of Western involvement in the Yu-
goslav conflict is the loss of the fragile balance previously existing in this 
part of the world. In order to bring the Serbs to heel, Western mediators 
opted to support the Albanian minority in Serbia. On the other hand, the 
Serbs were the only force in the Balkans capable of halting Albanian ex-
pansion. Eventually, the West largely lost control over the Albanians, as the 
events that took place in Kosovo in March 2004 have shown. As a reminder, 
within just three days in March thirty-five Christian churches were com-
pletely or partially demolished. Not to mention human casualties. Giving 
Kosovo a de facto independence, as envisaged by the Martti Ahtisaari plan, 
cannot resolve the problem of Serb-Albanian conflict in a sustainable way.
This exceptionally fast-rising Albanian expansion is the third process 
in the present-day Balkans. And it is an objective one. There is no doubt 
that at this moment the Albanians are the most active Balkan ethnic group, 
an ethnicity in nationalist ascent and striving for unification. They are also, 
as the Russian ethnographer Leo Gumilyov would put it, “the most pas-
sionate” of the Balkan peoples. Given that the Albanians live not only in 
Albania but also in Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Greece, further 
divisions in the Balkans can be feared. Here too some broader processes can 
be identified. Albanian expansion fits well into the same “southern belt of 
instability” making its way into Europe across the Balkans, and using Alba-
nia as the key destabilizing factor.
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Even though NATO is now fully established in the Balkans and the 
worst of the Yugoslav crisis is well behind us, the Albanian factor can still 
make itself pretty much felt.
*  *  *
It was our conscious intention to show how intricate and multifaceted the 
Yugoslav crisis was, and how important it has turned out to be for the future 
of the whole planet. It should be added at once that in the early 1990s there 
was no clear understanding in Russia of what was going on in the Balkans. 
For this simple reason Russia’s Balkan policy could not be but inadequate.
The Yugoslav crisis, which has impacted so greatly on the current 
development of international relations and new geopolitical divisions in the 
world, was initially perceived by Russian authorities as no more than an 
unpleasant obstacle on their way to the “civilized world”.
That is why Russia was among the first to recognize – well before 
any intra-Yugoslav agreements were reached – the independence of Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is why Russia willingly accepted to play by 
Western rules in solving the Yugoslav issue: big players impose their will 
onto the Yugoslav peoples, and the latter comply unquestioningly. Making 
use of her privileged position with the Serbian side, Russia was imposing 
the will of the so-called “international community” onto the FRY. At first, 
the Russian media also conveyed the predominantly Western view of the 
Yugoslav conflict, thereby shaping Russian public opinion.
It was only later that the Russian public swung in the opposite direc-
tion. The exorbitant price of the reforms became obvious, as did the un-
willingness of Western democracies to extend any kind of substantial aid 
to Russia. On the contrary, it was increasingly obvious that the difficul-
ties Russia was experiencing were only being used to weaken her further 
and push her out of the Balkans and the rest of Europe. The case in point 
was the onset of NATO’s eastward expansion. Accordingly, Russia’s idea of 
establishing a new pan-European system of security based on the OSCE 
framework ended in failure. This has turned out to be just as lethal for the 
OSCE. In our view, the OSCE as it is today is a virtually fringe organiza-
tion.
From about 1994, Russian diplomacy sought to become more syn-
chronized with the prevailing mood in Russian society, even more so as 
the Yugoslav crisis was becoming an internal rather than external policy 
issue. Yet, the change in the activity of the Foreign Ministry amounted to a 
change in style and phrasing in official statements. One could hear phrases 
about treating all sides in the conflict equally, recognizing the Balkans as 
an area of Russian interest and so forth. Some observers rashly read this as 
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Russia’s adopting a pro-Serbian stance. The reality was very different though. 
Among other things, Russia retained, together with the Western states, the 
severe regime of anti-Serbian sanctions, and even repeatedly voted for their 
tightening.
In the final stage of the Bosnian crisis NATO intervened openly 
against the Bosnian-Serb population in the Bosnian civil war. This was its 
first ever foreign intervention since its creation. And Russia was simply 
pushed aside; her services were no longer needed. What Russia was needed 
for was to play a supporting role in the process of solving the problem in 
order to secure its formal legitimacy, and in exerting by now traditional 
pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. Russia played this supporting role during 
the Dayton peace talks in November 1996 as well as during peace imple-
mentation operations in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The most surprising of all was that Russian diplomacy publicly de-
scribed its policy as tremendously successful, reporting one triumph after 
another and an ever-growing Russian influence in the Yugoslav events. The 
reality was very different.
The Kosovo crisis changed little with regard both to foreign interfer-
ence and to the position of Russia. Once again, it all led to a NATO attack, 
this time on the Serb-Montenegrin dual federation, Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, in March 1999. Once again, the West managed to tie the Serbs 
down and break their fierce resistance largely through the efforts of the 
Russian special envoy V. Chernomirdin.
After that and until recently – having got her fingers burnt many 
times while attempting to solve Balkan problems, and being de facto driven 
out of the Balkans – Russia almost demonstratively abstained from being 
involved in the Balkans. Top levels of Russian diplomacy stopped reporting 
victories scored in the Balkans. Quite the opposite, they seemed unwilling 
to remember the events in the former Yugoslavia, or even chose to forget 
them altogether. An indication of Russia’s attitude towards the Balkans was 
withdrawal of the few Russian peacekeepers from Bosnia and Kosovo.
In Russia’s relations with the Balkan states the so-called “measured-
political-dialogue” approach was used, the measure depending on their re-
spective attitudes towards Russia. Such a position, of course, lacked initia-
tive.
The only Russian initiative in recent years was Putin’s proposal to 
hold a Balkan conference which would discuss the inviolability of borders 
and human rights, but the initiative was left out in the open.
Recently, however, Russia has become more active in connection with 
the Kosovo status talks. The reasons for this reactivation may be found in 
Russia’s aspiration to translate her newly-gained economic power into po-
litical power, and also in the fact that there are in the post-Soviet territory as 
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well some unrecognized self-proclaimed states, moreover, for the most part 
pro-Russian. But what is central, in our view, is Russia’s desire to develop a 
conceptual framework for past events, and to prevent any breach of interna-
tional law in the future. Hence all those statements that stress the necessity 
of laying down “universal principles” applicable in all situations, not just in 
the case of Kosovo.
It is often heard that recognition of Kosovo’s independence, even in 
breach of international law, would put an end to all Balkan strife. But any-
one who has a profound understanding of the Balkans knows that nothing 
is that simple over there. In particular considering that today at least three 
national questions in the Balkans – Serbian, Albanian and Macedonian 
– remain pending.
The idealistic belief that all these problems will be almost automati-
cally resolved once the “Western Balkans” finds itself in the EU, or even just 
in NATO, seems completely incompatible with any sustainable long-term 
scenario.
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